By using the Cape Capital website (“Website”), you declare that:
By clicking “Accept all” you acknowledge and accept the following Important Legal Information and Terms of Use:
The content of this Website (including microsites) has been prepared by Cape Capital AG, with its registered address at Utoquai 55, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland (“Cape Capital”), duly registered at the commercial register of the Canton of Zurich with number CHE-109.617.147. and contains the views and opinions of the particular individuals and is for general information and marketing purposes only. All copyrights and other rights, included but not limited to logos and registered trademarks relating to the entire content of the Website are reserved exclusively to Cape Capital or the specifically designated right holders. Any use, in particular the reproduction or publication in full or in part is permitted only with the prior written consent of Cape Capital. Cape Capital may from time to time suspend the operation of this Website for repair, maintenance or improvement work, or in order to update or upgrade its content or functionality. Cape Capital may also change the format, content and/or access of this Website at any time at its sole discretion without notice. Although Cape Capital believes that information provided on this Website is based on reliable sources, content on this Website is presented only as of the date published or indicated, and may be superseded by subsequent market events or for other reasons. Therefore Cape Capital cannot assume responsibility for the quality, correctness, timeliness or completeness of the information contained herein. Unless otherwise stated, the numbers/figures on the Website are unaudited.
Cape Capital is a regulated asset manager of collective assets according to the Federal Act on Financial Institutions of 15 June 2018 (FinIA) and supervised by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, Laupenstrasse 27, CH-3003 Bern, Switzerland (FINMA). The Website contains information about various collective investments (“Funds”) which may have been registered or otherwise notified for distribution and marketing in the jurisdiction you have selected. Please note, that such registration or notification does not mean that the Funds are suitable for all investors and their investment objectives, financial situation and risk profile. As an asset manager of collective assets, Cape Capital is, among others, subject to the rules under the Swiss Financial Services Act (FinSA), the Swiss Collective Investment Schemes Act (CISA) and the Swiss Financial Institutions Act (FinIA).Cape Capital is affiliated to the following Ombudsman according to FinSA: Finanzombudsstelle Schweiz (FINOS), Talstrasse 20, CH-8001 Zurich, Switzerland. For further information, please refer to the General Client Information Document available on the Website which forms an integral part of these Conditions.
Nothing contained on this Website constitutes a solicitation, an offer or a recommendation to buy or sell any Cape Capital Funds or other financial instruments, nor does it constitute any form of personal investment advice which takes into account your personal circumstances. Cape Capital does not provide investment, legal, tax or other advice through this Website and nothing herein should be construed as such advice. Cape Capital does not represent that any Cape Capital collective assets or financial instruments mentioned on this Cape Capital website are suitable for any investor. Investment or other decisions should be made solely on the basis of the relevant product and/or service documents (prospectus/offering memorandum, fund contract/articles, key information documents, financial reports) of the respective collective investment. If not a Cape Capital client, it is strongly recommended to contact a professional financial advisor, tax consultant or other qualified expert in order to determine whether an investment in a Fund or other financial instrument corresponds to the specific requirements and preferred level of risk of the investor.
Any collective investment schemes mentioned on this Website may, unless explicitly stated otherwise, not be offered, sold or delivered to United States (U.S.) citizens or persons resident or incorporated in the U.S. and/or other natural or legal persons whose income and/or returns, regardless of origin, are subject to U.S. income tax, as well as persons who are considered to be U.S. persons pursuant to Regulation S of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and/or the U.S. Commodity Exchange Act, in each case as amended from time to time.
The provision of financial services and investments in Funds and other financial instruments involve opportunities but also bear risks, including the risk that the value of investments and the income therefrom may fall or rise and investors may not get back the full amount invested or may even lose all of their investment. Investors should ensure to have fully understood such risks before taking any investment decisions. Cape Capital strongly advises to consult the brochure “Risks Involved in Trading Financial Instruments” of the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) as well as the relevant documents of the respective Fund or financial instrument and to seek professional investment advice before taking any decision to invest. Investors should note, that these Conditions do not represent a complete statement of risks associated to a Fund or a financial instrument. Past performance is no indication of current or future performance. Performance data do not include commissions and costs incurred by investors when subscribing or redeeming Fund shares.Investments, in particular collective investments in private equity, venture capital and other illiquid assets involve an above-average degree of risk, including the risk that losses may even exceed the original investment and should be seen as long-term in nature.
The use of this Website, including any information accessed, downloaded or otherwise obtained through the Website is at your own risk. This Website, together with all content, information and materials contained therein, is provided “as is” and “as available”, without any representations or warranties of any kind, whether express or implied, with respect to the Website, and all information and functionalities contained therein.
IN NO EVENT SHALL CAPE CAPITAL BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, CONSEQUENTIAL OR OTHER DAMAGES (INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF DATA, BUSINESS OR PROFITS) ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THESE CONDITIONS, THIS WEBSITE, THE INABILITY TO USE THIS WEBSITE OR ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED OR STORED THERFROM. Cape Capital excludes any liability for any loss, damage or alteration of any kind including but not limited to transmission to losses, delays, misunderstandings, unauthorized interception by third parties, duplication or fraud, except in the event of gross negligence on the part of Cape Capital. Any transmission or download of information is entirely at your own risk.
The hyperlinks on the Website are only provided for information and convenience purposes. Cape Capital is not responsible for the content of external websites that link or are accessible from this Website. Cape Capital does not assume any responsibility or liability with respect to any website accessed via this Website. Please note that when you click on any external website’s hypertext link you will leave this Website. You should review the privacy statements of such websites carefully before you provide any personal or confidential information.
The use of electronic communication channels, in particular unencrypted e-mails and text messages, is associated with various risks which may include, but are not limited to, the risk of transmission errors, alterations or duplications, the risk of interception or manipulation of content and the risk of introducing malicious software (malware) by unauthorized third parties. By using such electronic communication channels, you accept these risks and agree to bear any resulting losses or damages.
Cape Capital has established a Cape Capital Privacy Notice, which forms an integral part of these Conditions. It explains how personal data is collected and processed at Cape Capital, including this Website. Cape Capital uses cookies to personalize and improve site experience. You can at any time change or withdraw your consent from the Cookie Declaration on the Website. Your consent applies to the following domains: capecapital.com. Your current state: Consent accepted or Consent rejected. Manage your consent.
The access and use of this Website, and these present Conditions are governed by substantive Swiss law with the exclusion of the conflict of law principles. The place of jurisdiction is Zurich, Switzerland.
Last Update: October 2024
'Psychology of the masses' (Gustave Le Bon, 1895)—when digitalisation drives deposits, a new psychological phenomenon is the price, says Michael Lienhard
Everyone has rationalised why there is a growing list of collapsed US banks—so far the tally includes Silicon Valley bank, Signature, and First Republic. When the dust settles, things may look clear and logical but, ex-ante, how are we investors going to deal with an additional dimension of systemic risks that cannot be explained by an appeal to rationality?
As credit investors we deal with default probabilities, or, for those which see the glass almost full: survival probabilities.
The negatively skewed return distribution of credit risk is derived from the combination of a capped upside—meaning that the investor can only earn a certain amount of interest on their investment, regardless of how well the borrower performs—and full downside risk—meaning that the borrower may default on their debt obligation, causing the investor to lose their entire investment.
Within a well-diversified and actively managed credit portfolio, the return compensation tends to outweigh the pure default risks.
Investing in credit risk of large international enterprises can create good income, unless a tail-event—a global pandemic, war, or financial crisis, for example—occurs. In other words, we are here to model, assess, analyse the probability of ‘unthinkable’ and put a price on it.
From a simplistic top-down perspective, company specific risks have to be put in context with so-called ‘systemic risks’. If you look at safe haven companies like Nestlé or Johnson & Johnson, the credit spread—a good barometer of economic health—consists mainly of systemic risks, as company specific risks are deemed as minimal.
Therefore, even in the hypothetical case that the company-specific risk is zero there is no ‘risk-free yield curve’—as there is no company or financial instrument in the world that is not exposed to the interconnected global financial system.
That system is vulnerable, the systemic risks attached to it have a price, and the number of variables behind that price has increased. Variables that are not so easy to explain, but this credit investor shall try.
Digitalisation has transformed all aspects of life, making information and money more easily accessible and transferable to everybody. This has led to a gigantic merger of ‘masses’. Like a mass wave in a football stadium, or a murmuration of starlings, we are increasingly susceptible to the influence of others. In the financial system, anticipation for what ‘others might think’ partially supersedes rational arguments.
The GameStop phenomenon—where a host of amateur retail traders sent shares of GameStop Corp rocketing—and the recent banking sector turmoil have a link. Some might say a weak one, some might say a strong one, I believe it’s a critical one: ‘fantasy’ is now fixed in our financial system, with little means to ever unfix it. Instead, we must learn to work with it.
Fantasy is a powerful feature of the financial system, stemming from the natural by-products of technological evolution, financial consumerism, mass-media and globalisation—not to mention an absolute awareness for the extent of the global multi-crises like climate, conflict, covid, and now credit.
These developments have become prominent forces in all areas of the system, which helps us understand why markets behave so erratically in modern-day finance. But there is one area in the financial system where mass behaviour is not adequately considered: risk controls. This, in my view, is an urgent issue when it comes to controlling the risk of bank runs that, thanks to digitalisation, can happen in a matter of hours not weeks and can help fuel mass fear and contagion like that which we recently witnessed.
We waited a long time to transition from Basel II to Basel III to have better liquidity and capital ratios in banks. However, ‘capital good plus liquidity good, so all good’ does not work in a world of digitalisation and heightened risk of consumers being able to pull their deposits.
Additional guarantees, liquidity backstops and related measures may have to come fast. In addition, bank bond investors should grow suspicious of any CEOs or CFOs tweeting that ‘everything really is fine and capital and liquidity ratios are strong.’ This might just be the equivalent of ‘I don’t want to comment on the problem’.
For sure, decent capital and liquidity ratios offer a certain degree of reassurance. However, during the recent banking sector turmoil it was the deposit beta and price-to-book ratio which have driven the fears. Deposit heterogeneity may help as much as strong ratios. Geographically dispersed and highly fragmented banks like Santander or HSBC are good representatives of the ‘what-about-them’ group and may turn out to be safer banks from a credit perspective than many better capitalised financial institutes that are exposed to deposit contagion. Meanwhile, as a long-term credit investor, I’m most interested in what this new development means for understanding the broader systemic risks prevalent in markets.
The efforts by central banks to bring down core inflation by raising interest rates have not (yet) sufficiently worked. Instead, it has led to cracks in the banking sector which have caused an immediate tightening of financial conditions as lending standards become more restrictive.
Derived from that there are two scenarios:
The first assumes that the financial tightening was enough to ‘provoke’ more defaults, layoffs and finally a weaker consumer, so that economic growth will deteriorate in sympathy with inflation. In this case, bond-equity tandem will break meaning that bonds would start to diversify equities again, after an extraordinarily high correlation which lasted a long time.
The second sounds more optimistic and assumes that the financial tightening is not enough to decisively bring down business activity and growth. While this is undoubtedly a good scenario in the short-term, we fear that this will kill any interest-rate pivot-fantasies meaning higher rates for longer. The problem with this is that investors and institutions holding big sums of US Treasuries as their ‘safe-haven’ allocations will continue to lose money. In this scenario, it’s possible to link the recent banking turmoil to a (too) supportive fiscal policy regime. In other words, the supportive action to avoid a recession has muted the impact of higher interest rates, causing them to climb even higher, which ultimately hurts bond holders, leading to deposit-squeezed bank runs.
Fiscal stimulus leading to bank runs—as people buy Treasury Bills and GameStop—is not my cup of tea to comment on. The main takeaway is that there is new force driving systemic risks which credit investors must price accordingly. For the glass-half-full investors, there’s as much opportunity as there is challenge. Crucially, we must never underestimate the power of the masses.
Michael Lienhard
Head of Fixed Income at Cape Capital